Hands only illusion: multisensory integration elicits sense of ownership for body parts but not for non-corporeal objects

Manos Tsakiris, Lewis Carpenter, Dafydd James, Aikaterini Fotopoulou

The experience of body ownership can be successfully manipulated during the rubber hand illusion using synchronous multisensory stimulation. The hypothesis that multisensory integration is both a necessary and sufficient condition for body ownership is debated. We systematically varied the appearance of the object that was stimulated in synchrony or asynchrony with the participant's hand. A viewed object that was transformed in three stages from a plain wooden block to a wooden hand was compared to a realistic rubber hand. Introspective and behavioural results show that participants experience a sense of ownership only for the realistic prosthetic hand, suggesting that not all objects can be experienced as part of one's body. Instead, the viewed object must fit with a reference model of the body that contains important structural information about body parts. This body model can distinguish between corporeal and non-corporeal objects, and it therefore plays a critical role in maintaining a coherent sense of one's body.