Title |
Defeasible reasoning with legal conditionals
|
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Published in |
Memory & Cognition, December 2015
|
DOI | 10.3758/s13421-015-0574-7 |
Pubmed ID | |
Authors |
Lupita Estefania Gazzo Castañeda, Markus Knauff |
Abstract |
Valid conclusions can be defeated if people can think of conditions that prevent the consequent to occur although the antecedent is given. The goal of the present research was to investigate how people consider these conditions when reasoning with legal conditionals such as "If a person kills another human, then this person should be punished for manslaughter." In Experiments 1 and 2 legal conditionals were presented to participants together with exculpatory circumstances, i.e., counterexamples. The participants' task was to decide whether they would adhere to the legal conditional rule and punish the offender. Participants were either lawyers (i.e., advanced law students and graduate lawyers) or legal laypeople. We found that laypeople often ignore exculpatory circumstances and adhere to the conditional rule when offences evoked high levels of moral outrage. Lawyers did not show this effect. In Experiment 3 laypeople showed difficulties even when asked to simply imagine exculpatory circumstances for highly morally outrageous offences. Results provide new evidence for the role of emotions - like moral outrage - in the consideration of counterexamples to legal conditionals. |
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