Current evidence for automatic Theory of Mind processing in adults

Dana Schneider, Virginia P Slaughter, Paul E Dux

Theory of Mind (ToM) is thought to play a key role in social information processing as it refers to the ability of individuals to represent the mental states of others (e.g., intentions, desires, beliefs). A provocative hypothesis has been put forward which espouses the existence of two ToM systems: one that is implicit and involves the automatic analysis of the belief states of others and another that is not automatic and is involved in explicitly reasoning about others' mental states. Recently, Phillips et al. (2015) have suggested that there is limited evidence for automatic ToM processing, after identifying a confound in a previous high-profile paper supporting the existence of this cognitive operation in infants and adults (Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010). Here, we take a broader view of the literature and find, contrary to the conclusions of Phillips et al., that there is a substantial body of literature which demonstrates that adult humans are able to engage in unconscious and unintentional, and thus automatic, analyses of others' mental states. However, whether this ability is best described under a one, two or multiple systems ToM account remains to be determined.