Implicit false-belief processing in the human brain

Dana Schneider, Virginia P. Slaughter, Stefanie I. Becker, Paul E. Dux

Eye-movement patterns in 'Sally-Anne' tasks reflect humans' ability to implicitly process the mental states of others, particularly false-beliefs - a key theory of mind (ToM) operation. It has recently been proposed that an efficient ToM system, which operates in the absence of awareness (implicit ToM, iToM), subserves the analysis of belief-like states. This contrasts to consciously available belief processing, performed by the explicit ToM system (eToM). The frontal, temporal and parietal cortices are engaged when humans explicitly 'mentalize' about others' beliefs. However, the neural underpinnings of implicit false-belief processing and the extent to which they draw on networks involved in explicit general-belief processing are unknown. Here, participants watched 'Sally-Anne' movies while fMRI and eye-tracking measures were acquired simultaneously. Participants displayed eye-movements consistent with implicit false-belief processing. After independently localizing the brain areas involved in explicit general-belief processing, only the left anterior superior temporal sulcus and precuneus revealed greater blood-oxygen-level-dependent activity for false- relative to true-belief trials in our iToM paradigm. No such difference was found for the right temporal-parietal junction despite significant activity in this area. These findings fractionate brain regions that are associated with explicit general ToM reasoning and false-belief processing in the absence of awareness.