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Knowing, Anticipating, Even Facilitating but Still not Intending: Another Challenge to Double Effect Reasoning

Overview of attention for article published in Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, December 2017
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26 Mendeley
Title
Knowing, Anticipating, Even Facilitating but Still not Intending: Another Challenge to Double Effect Reasoning
Published in
Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, December 2017
DOI 10.1007/s11673-017-9827-4
Pubmed ID
Authors

S. Duckett

Abstract

A recent administrative law decision in Victoria, Australia, applied double effect reasoning in a novel way. Double effect reasoning has hitherto been used to legitimate treatments which may shorten life but where the intent of treatment is pain relief. The situation reviewed by the Victorian tribunal went further, supporting actions where a doctor agrees to provide pentobarbitone (Nembutal) to a patient at some time in the future if the patient feels at that time that his pain is unbearable and he wants to end his life. The offer to provide the drug was described as a palliative treatment in that it gave reassurance and comfort to the patient. Double effect reasoning was extended in this instance to encompass potentially facilitating a patient's death. This extension further muddies the murky double effect reasoning waters and creates another challenge to this concept.

X Demographics

X Demographics

The data shown below were collected from the profiles of 3 X users who shared this research output. Click here to find out more about how the information was compiled.
Mendeley readers

Mendeley readers

The data shown below were compiled from readership statistics for 26 Mendeley readers of this research output. Click here to see the associated Mendeley record.

Geographical breakdown

Country Count As %
Unknown 26 100%

Demographic breakdown

Readers by professional status Count As %
Student > Master 4 15%
Student > Doctoral Student 3 12%
Researcher 3 12%
Student > Ph. D. Student 2 8%
Lecturer 2 8%
Other 2 8%
Unknown 10 38%
Readers by discipline Count As %
Psychology 6 23%
Medicine and Dentistry 4 15%
Nursing and Health Professions 3 12%
Philosophy 1 4%
Social Sciences 1 4%
Other 1 4%
Unknown 10 38%
Attention Score in Context

Attention Score in Context

This research output has an Altmetric Attention Score of 2. This is our high-level measure of the quality and quantity of online attention that it has received. This Attention Score, as well as the ranking and number of research outputs shown below, was calculated when the research output was last mentioned on 12 December 2017.
All research outputs
#14,718,998
of 23,577,654 outputs
Outputs from Journal of Bioethical Inquiry
#394
of 615 outputs
Outputs of similar age
#241,108
of 442,824 outputs
Outputs of similar age from Journal of Bioethical Inquiry
#13
of 17 outputs
Altmetric has tracked 23,577,654 research outputs across all sources so far. This one is in the 35th percentile – i.e., 35% of other outputs scored the same or lower than it.
So far Altmetric has tracked 615 research outputs from this source. They typically receive a lot more attention than average, with a mean Attention Score of 10.2. This one is in the 32nd percentile – i.e., 32% of its peers scored the same or lower than it.
Older research outputs will score higher simply because they've had more time to accumulate mentions. To account for age we can compare this Altmetric Attention Score to the 442,824 tracked outputs that were published within six weeks on either side of this one in any source. This one is in the 42nd percentile – i.e., 42% of its contemporaries scored the same or lower than it.
We're also able to compare this research output to 17 others from the same source and published within six weeks on either side of this one. This one is in the 23rd percentile – i.e., 23% of its contemporaries scored the same or lower than it.