The New Counter-insurgency Era in Critical Perspective

Chapter 1 Introduction

Chapter 2 Minting New COIN: Critiquing Counter-insurgency Theory

Chapter 3 COIN and the Chameleon: The Category Errors of Trying to Divide the Indivisible

Chapter 4 Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unspoken Paradox of Large-Scale Expeditionary COIN

Chapter 5 Government in a Box? Counter-insurgency, State Building, and the Technocratic Conceit

Chapter 6 ‘Our Ghettos, Too, Need a Lansdale’: American Counter-insurgency Abroad and at Home in the Vietnam Era

Chapter 7 Bringing the Soil Back in: Control and Territoriality in Western and Non-Western COIN

Chapter 8 Counter-insurgency and Violence Management

Chapter 9 Mass, Methods, and Means: The Northern Ireland ‘Model’ of Counter-insurgency

Chapter 10 David Galula and the Revival of COIN in the US Military

Chapter 11 Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?

Chapter 12 After a Decade of Counter-insurgency, Eliminate Nation-Building from US Military Manuals

Chapter 13 The Conceit of American Counter-insurgency

Chapter 14 ‘The Population Is the Enemy’: Control, Behaviour, and Counter-insurgency in Central Helmand Province, Afghanistan

Chapter 15 The Reluctant Counter-insurgents: Britain’s Absent Surge in Southern Iraq

Chapter 16 Questions about COIN after Iraq and Afghanistan

Chapter 17 The Military Utility and Interventions Post-Afghanistan: Reassessing Ends, Ways, and Means

Chapter 18 ‘What Do We Do If We Are Never Going to Do This Again?’ Western Counter-insurgency Choices after Iraq and Afghanistan