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The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking

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Cover of 'The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking'

Table of Contents

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    Book Overview
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    Chapter 1 Introduction
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    Chapter 2 Rent-Seeking Versus Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking Activities
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    Chapter 3 In Search of Rent-Seeking
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    Chapter 4 Rents and Rent-Seeking
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    Chapter 5 The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
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    Chapter 6 Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power
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    Chapter 7 Efficient Rent-Seeking Revisited
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    Chapter 8 Long-Run Equilibrium and Total Expenditures in Rent-Seeking
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    Chapter 9 Long-Run Equilibrium and Total Expenditures in Rent-Seeking: A Comment
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    Chapter 10 Rent-Seeking Behavior in the Long Run
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    Chapter 11 Free Entry and Efficient Rent-Seeking
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    Chapter 12 Back to the Bog
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    Chapter 13 Life Among the Triangles and Trapezoids: Notes on the Theory of Rent-Seeking
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    Chapter 14 Dispelling the Disinterest in Deregulation
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    Chapter 15 Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation
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    Chapter 16 Ideology, Interest Groups, and the Repeal of the Corn Laws
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    Chapter 17 Rent-Seeking and Trade Protection
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    Chapter 18 Voters as Investors: A Rent-Seeking Resolution of the Paradox of Voting
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    Chapter 19 Committees and Rent-Seeking Effort
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    Chapter 20 Government and Its Bureaucracy: A Bilateral Bargaining Versus a Principal-Agent Approach
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    Chapter 21 Demand Revealing, Transfers, and Rent-Seeking
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    Chapter 22 Competing for Aid
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    Chapter 23 Managerial Rents and Outside Recruitment in the Coasian Firm
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    Chapter 24 Optimal Taxation in a Rent-Seeking Environment
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    Chapter 25 Rent-Seeking and Its Implications for Pollution Taxation
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    Chapter 26 Privatizing the Commons: An Improvement?
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    Chapter 27 Corporate Chartering: An Exploration in the Economics of Legal Change
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    Chapter 28 Why Did the Industrial Revolution Occur in England?
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    Chapter 29 Agency, Economic Calculation, and Constitutional Construction
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    Chapter 30 Rent-Seeking in Constitutional Perspective
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    Chapter 31 Future Directions for Rent-Seeking Research
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Title
The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking
Published by
Springer US, April 2013
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4757-1963-5
ISBNs
978-1-4419-5200-4, 978-1-4757-1963-5
Editors

Rowley, Charles K., Tollison, Robert D., Tullock, Gordon

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Mendeley readers

The data shown below were compiled from readership statistics for 2 Mendeley readers of this research output. Click here to see the associated Mendeley record.

Geographical breakdown

Country Count As %
Unknown 2 100%

Demographic breakdown

Readers by professional status Count As %
Student > Ph. D. Student 1 50%
Lecturer 1 50%
Readers by discipline Count As %
Economics, Econometrics and Finance 1 50%
Social Sciences 1 50%