| Title |
Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: an Empirical Study
|
|---|---|
| Published in |
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, January 2010
|
| DOI | 10.1007/s13164-009-0014-3 |
| Pubmed ID | |
| Authors |
Joshua May, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jay G. Hull, Aaron Zimmerman |
| Abstract |
In defending his interest-relative account of knowledge, Jason Stanley relies heavily on intuitions about several bank cases. We experimentally test the empirical claims that Stanley seems to make concerning our common-sense intuitions about these cases. Additionally, we test the empirical claims that Jonathan Schaffer seems to make, regarding the salience of an alternative, in his critique of Stanley. Our data indicate that neither raising the possibility of error nor raising stakes moves most people from attributing knowledge to denying it. However, the raising of stakes (but not alternatives) does affect the level of confidence people have in their attributions of knowledge. We argue that our data impugn what both Stanley and Schaffer claim our common-sense judgments about such cases are. |
X Demographics
The data shown below were collected from the profiles of 2 X users who shared this research output. Click here to find out more about how the information was compiled.
Geographical breakdown
| Country | Count | As % |
|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | 1 | 50% |
| Unknown | 1 | 50% |
Demographic breakdown
| Type | Count | As % |
|---|---|---|
| Members of the public | 2 | 100% |
Mendeley readers
The data shown below were compiled from readership statistics for 53 Mendeley readers of this research output. Click here to see the associated Mendeley record.
Geographical breakdown
| Country | Count | As % |
|---|---|---|
| United States | 6 | 11% |
| Chile | 1 | 2% |
| Germany | 1 | 2% |
| Unknown | 45 | 85% |
Demographic breakdown
| Readers by professional status | Count | As % |
|---|---|---|
| Student > Ph. D. Student | 13 | 25% |
| Student > Bachelor | 7 | 13% |
| Researcher | 5 | 9% |
| Professor > Associate Professor | 5 | 9% |
| Student > Master | 4 | 8% |
| Other | 13 | 25% |
| Unknown | 6 | 11% |
| Readers by discipline | Count | As % |
|---|---|---|
| Philosophy | 25 | 47% |
| Psychology | 12 | 23% |
| Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology | 2 | 4% |
| Social Sciences | 2 | 4% |
| Computer Science | 2 | 4% |
| Other | 4 | 8% |
| Unknown | 6 | 11% |
Attention Score in Context
This research output has an Altmetric Attention Score of 5. This is our high-level measure of the quality and quantity of online attention that it has received. This Attention Score, as well as the ranking and number of research outputs shown below, was calculated when the research output was last mentioned on 23 December 2019.
All research outputs
#6,159,126
of 22,849,304 outputs
Outputs from Review of Philosophy and Psychology
#138
of 425 outputs
Outputs of similar age
#40,280
of 164,906 outputs
Outputs of similar age from Review of Philosophy and Psychology
#6
of 10 outputs
Altmetric has tracked 22,849,304 research outputs across all sources so far. This one has received more attention than most of these and is in the 72nd percentile.
So far Altmetric has tracked 425 research outputs from this source. They typically receive a little more attention than average, with a mean Attention Score of 7.0. This one has gotten more attention than average, scoring higher than 66% of its peers.
Older research outputs will score higher simply because they've had more time to accumulate mentions. To account for age we can compare this Altmetric Attention Score to the 164,906 tracked outputs that were published within six weeks on either side of this one in any source. This one has done well, scoring higher than 75% of its contemporaries.
We're also able to compare this research output to 10 others from the same source and published within six weeks on either side of this one. This one has scored higher than 4 of them.