Dual-Process Theories in Moral Psychology

Chapter 1 Dimensions of Moral Intuitions – Metaethics, Epistemology and Moral Psychology

Chapter 2 Where and When Ethics Needs Empirical Facts

Chapter 3 Normativity of Moral Intuitions in the Social Intuitionist Model

Chapter 4 Psychology Instead of Ethics? Why Psychological Research Is Important but Cannot Replace Ethics

Chapter 5 Motive for Young Children’s Developing Concern for Others’ Well-Being as a Core Motive for Developing Prosocial Behavior

Chapter 6 Moral Argumentation Skills and Aggressive Behavior. Implications for Philosophical Ethics

Chapter 7 Psychology’s Contribution to Ethics: Two Case Studies

Chapter 8 Moral Judgments and Moral Integrity – Three Empirical Studies

Chapter 9 Moral Intuitionism and Empirical Data

Chapter 10 Can Biological Approaches Explain (Im)Moral Behavior? Problems and Potentials of Studies Focused on a Genetic Predisposition of Human Behavior

Chapter 11 Aristotle’s Moral Philosophy and Moral Psychology A Basic Terminology

Chapter 12 The ‘New Synthesis in Moral Psychology’ versus Aristotelianism. Content and Consequences

Chapter 13 Ethos, Eidos, Habitus A Social Theoretical Contribution to Morality and Ethics

Chapter 14 Pragmatism, Religion, and Ethics A Reminder from Rorty

Chapter 15 Making Trouble: Mindfulness as a Care Ethic

Chapter 16 Rationalist vs. Intuitionist Views on Morality A Sociological Perspective

Chapter 17 Can Antimoralism Avoid Moralizing? Reflections on the Relation of Science to Ethics

Chapter 18 Uncovering ‘the Political’ in Political Psychology

Chapter 19 The Crisis of Pedagogy and the Potentials of Professional Ethics