Dual conception of risk in the Iowa Gambling Task: effects of sleep deprivation and test-retest gap

Varsha Singh

Risk in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is often understood in terms of intertemporal choices, i.e., preference for immediate outcomes in favor of delayed outcomes is considered risky decision making. According to behavioral economics, healthy decision makers are expected to refrain from choosing the short-sighted immediate gain because, over time (10 trials of the IGT), the immediate gains result in a long term loss (net loss). Instead decision makers are expected to maximize their gains by choosing options that, over time (10 trials), result in delayed or long term gains (net gain). However, task choices are sometimes made on the basis of the frequency of reward and punishment such that frequent rewards/infrequent punishments are favored over infrequent rewards/frequent punishments. The presence of these two attributes (intertemporality and frequency of reward) in IGT decision making may correspond to the emotion-cognition dichotomy and reflect a dual conception of risk. Decision making on the basis of the two attributes was tested under two conditions: delay in retest and sleep deprivation. An interaction between sleep deprivation and time delay was expected to attenuate the difference between the two attributes. Participants were 40 male university students. Analysis of the effects of IGT attribute type (intertemporal vs. frequency of reinforcement), sleep deprivation (sleep deprivation vs. no sleep deprivation), and test-retest gap (short vs. long delay) showed a significant within-subjects effect of IGT attribute type thus confirming the difference between the two attributes. Sleep deprivation had no effect on the attributes, but test-retest gap and the three-way interaction between attribute type, test-retest gap, and sleep deprivation were significantly different. Post-hoc tests revealed that sleep deprivation and short test-retest gap attenuated the difference between the two attributes. Furthermore, the results showed an expected trend of increase in intertemporal decision making at retest suggesting that intertemporal decision making benefited from repeated task exposure. The present findings add to understanding of the emotion-cognition dichotomy. Further, they show an important time-dependent effect of a universally experienced constraint (sleep deprivation) on decision making. It is concluded that risky decision making in the IGT is contingent on the attribute under consideration and is affected by factors such as time elapsed and constraint experienced before the retest.