A game theoretic framework for incentive-based models of intrinsic motivation in artificial systems

Kathryn E. Merrick, Kamran Shafi

An emerging body of research is focusing on understanding and building artificial systems that can achieve open-ended development influenced by intrinsic motivations. In particular, research in robotics and machine learning is yielding systems and algorithms with increasing capacity for self-directed learning and autonomy. Traditional software architectures and algorithms are being augmented with intrinsic motivations to drive cumulative acquisition of knowledge and skills. Intrinsic motivations have recently been considered in reinforcement learning, active learning and supervised learning settings among others. This paper considers game theory as a novel setting for intrinsic motivation. A game theoretic framework for intrinsic motivation is formulated by introducing the concept of optimally motivating incentive as a lens through which players perceive a game. Transformations of four well-known mixed-motive games are presented to demonstrate the perceived games when players' optimally motivating incentive falls in three cases corresponding to strong power, affiliation and achievement motivation. We use agent-based simulations to demonstrate that players with different optimally motivating incentive act differently as a result of their altered perception of the game. We discuss the implications of these results both for modeling human behavior and for designing artificial agents or robots.