Individual preferences and democratic processes: two theorems with implications for electoral politics

Overview of attention for article published in Social Choice and Welfare, February 2019

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In the top 25% of all research outputs scored by Altmetric
Among the highest-scoring outputs from this source (#34 of 450)
High Attention Score compared to outputs of the same age (82nd percentile)
Good Attention Score compared to outputs of the same age and source (66th percentile)

So far, Altmetric has seen 13 X posts from 13 X users, with an upper bound of 252,785 followers.

RT @kaushikcbasu: My paper with Tapan Mitra, giving a full characterization of Nash equilibria for electoral games. Just published in Socia…

RT @kaushikcbasu: My paper with Tapan Mitra, giving a full characterization of Nash equilibria for electoral games. Just published in Socia…

RT @kaushikcbasu: My paper with Tapan Mitra, giving a full characterization of Nash equilibria for electoral games. Just published in Socia…

RT @kaushikcbasu: My paper with Tapan Mitra, giving a full characterization of Nash equilibria for electoral games. Just published in Socia…

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