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Mendeley readers
| Chapter title |
Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment
|
|---|---|
| Chapter number | 15 |
| Book title |
Markets, Games, and Organizations
|
| Published by |
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, January 2003
|
| DOI | 10.1007/978-3-540-24784-5_15 |
| Book ISBNs |
978-3-64-253465-2, 978-3-54-024784-5
|
| Authors |
Jess Benhabib, Aldo Rustichini, Andrés Velasco |
Mendeley readers
The data shown below were compiled from readership statistics for 2 Mendeley readers of this research output. Click here to see the associated Mendeley record.
Geographical breakdown
| Country | Count | As % |
|---|---|---|
| Italy | 1 | 50% |
| Unknown | 1 | 50% |
Demographic breakdown
| Readers by professional status | Count | As % |
|---|---|---|
| Student > Ph. D. Student | 2 | 100% |
| Readers by discipline | Count | As % |
|---|---|---|
| Economics, Econometrics and Finance | 2 | 100% |