Title |
A Theory of Waiting Time Reporting and Quality Signaling
|
---|---|
Published in |
Health economics (Online), August 2015
|
DOI | 10.1002/hec.3222 |
Pubmed ID | |
Authors |
Yijuan Chen, Juergen Meinecke, Peter Sivey |
Abstract |
We develop a theoretical model to study a policy that publicly reports hospital waiting times. We characterize two effects of such a policy: the 'competition effect' that drives hospitals to compete for patients by increasing service rates and reducing waiting times and the 'signaling effect' that allows patients to distinguish a high-quality hospital from a low-quality one. While for a low-quality hospital both effects help reduce waiting time, for a high-quality hospital, they act in opposite directions. We show that the competition effect will outweigh the signaling effect for the high-quality hospital, and consequently, both hospitals' waiting times will be reduced by the introduction of the policy. This result holds in a policy environment where maximum waiting time targets are not binding. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
X Demographics
Geographical breakdown
Country | Count | As % |
---|---|---|
United States | 2 | 40% |
Spain | 1 | 20% |
Unknown | 2 | 40% |
Demographic breakdown
Type | Count | As % |
---|---|---|
Members of the public | 3 | 60% |
Scientists | 2 | 40% |
Mendeley readers
Geographical breakdown
Country | Count | As % |
---|---|---|
Unknown | 21 | 100% |
Demographic breakdown
Readers by professional status | Count | As % |
---|---|---|
Student > Master | 5 | 24% |
Researcher | 5 | 24% |
Student > Ph. D. Student | 2 | 10% |
Other | 1 | 5% |
Lecturer | 1 | 5% |
Other | 2 | 10% |
Unknown | 5 | 24% |
Readers by discipline | Count | As % |
---|---|---|
Business, Management and Accounting | 4 | 19% |
Economics, Econometrics and Finance | 4 | 19% |
Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology | 2 | 10% |
Medicine and Dentistry | 2 | 10% |
Computer Science | 1 | 5% |
Other | 2 | 10% |
Unknown | 6 | 29% |